Nov 20, 2026·11 min read·1 visit
An unchecked slice index read in Aether Project AMF's NGAP PathSwitchRequest handler allows a connected gNodeB with a valid AMF-UE-NGAP-ID to crash the AMF daemon via an empty extensible ASN.1 APER bit string in the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element.
CVE-2026-102945 is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) of the Aether Project (omec-project/amf) prior to version 3.1.6. When processing an NGAP PathSwitchRequest message over the 3GPP N2 interface, the HandlePathSwitchRequest function fails to verify the byte slice lengths of extensible APER bit strings inside the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element before accessing index zero. Because the NGAP receive goroutine lacks a panic recovery handler, supplying a zero-length bit string triggers an out-of-bounds slice read panic that terminates the entire AMF daemon.
The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the Aether Project (omec-project/amf) is a critical control-plane component within a 3GPP 5G Standalone (5G SA) core network. It is responsible for terminating Non-Access Stratum (NAS) signaling, managing subscriber registration, enforcing NAS ciphering and integrity protection, and handling mobility management across the Radio Access Network (RAN). The AMF exposes the N2 reference point over Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) port 38412, communicating with gNodeB (gNB) base stations via the Next Generation Application Protocol (NGAP) as defined in 3GPP TS 38.413.
In omec-project/amf versions prior to v3.1.6, a denial-of-service vulnerability exists within the NGAP message handling logic in ngap/handler.go. Specifically, the HandlePathSwitchRequest function improperly validates the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element (IE) during Xn-based handover procedures. The handler checks whether the top-level UESecurityCapabilities struct pointer is non-nil, but fails to verify the length of the underlying byte slices representing the UE's supported encryption and integrity protection algorithms before indexing into them.
Because the NRencryptionAlgorithms and NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms fields are defined in the 3GPP ASN.1 specification as extensible Aligned Packet Encoding Rules (APER) bit strings, an ASN.1 payload with the extension bit enabled can legally decode into an empty byte slice ([]byte{}) without raising a deserialization error. When HandlePathSwitchRequest performs six consecutive index-zero reads (Value.Bytes[0]) against these empty slices, the Go runtime triggers an out-of-bounds index panic (CWE-125).
Furthermore, the NGAP message processing pipeline in omec-project/amf executes within a goroutine that does not implement a deferred recover() handler (CWE-248). Consequently, the runtime panic is uncaught and immediately terminates the entire AMF operating system process. While triggering this flaw requires an attacker to control a connected gNB on the N2 interface and possess a registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID, successful exploitation results in a total loss of 5G control-plane availability for all connected base stations and subscribers managed by that AMF instance.
To understand the root cause of CVE-2026-102945, it is necessary to examine how 3GPP TS 38.413 defines the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element and how ASN.1 APER decoders process extensible constraints. During an Xn handover, a target gNB transmits an NGAP PathSwitchRequest message to inform the AMF that a User Equipment (UE) has moved to a new cell and that downlink PDU session user-plane tunnels must be switched. This message optionally includes UESecurityCapabilities, which contains two primary fields for 5G New Radio (NR): NRencryptionAlgorithms and NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.
In the 3GPP ASN.1 grammar, both algorithm fields are defined with the constraint BIT STRING (SIZE(16, ...)). Under standard APER encoding rules, if the extension marker bit is set to 0, the bit string is strictly constrained to 16 bits (exactly 2 bytes), and the decoder will reject payloads that deviate from this size. However, the presence of the ellipsis (...) indicates that the type is extensible to accommodate future 3GPP specification releases. When an encoder sets the APER extension bit to 1, the fixed 16-bit size constraint is bypassed, and the length of the bit string is encoded dynamically as a semi-constrained whole number.
If an incoming NGAP packet sets the extension bit to 1 and specifies a bit-string length of 0, the underlying Go APER decoding library considers the syntax valid according to ASN.1 rules. It returns a populated UESecurityCapabilities struct where NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes and NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes are initialized as zero-length byte slices (len == 0), and it returns a nil error to the caller. This disparity between syntactic ASN.1 validity and semantic domain requirements (CWE-1284) forms the foundation of the vulnerability.
When execution reaches HandlePathSwitchRequest in ngap/handler.go, the application code assumes that a successful ASN.1 decode guarantees at least two bytes of data in each bit string. The code performs bitmask operations directly on index 0 of both slices (Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80, 0x40, and 0x20) to extract the 128-bit 5G encryption (NEA1, NEA2, NEA3) and integrity (NIA1, NIA2, NIA3) capability flags. Attempting to read index 0 of a zero-length slice violates Go's memory safety bounds check, immediately halting execution with panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0.
The vulnerable logic resides in ngap/handler.go within the HandlePathSwitchRequest function. Prior to version 3.1.6, the function iterated through the Protocol IEs of the incoming PathSwitchRequest PDU, extracted the uESecurityCapabilities pointer, and validated earlier mandatory identifiers such as AMFUENGAPID. Once the UE context (amfUe) was resolved, the handler executed the following block:
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
// not support any E-UTRA algorithms
}As shown above, the condition if uESecurityCapabilities != nil only confirms that the optional UESecurityCapabilities IE was included in the NGAP message. It provides no assurance regarding the internal slice lengths of NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes or NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes. If either slice is empty, the first corresponding .Value.Bytes[0] dereference triggers a fatal runtime panic.
In commit d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c (merged via Pull Request #767 for release v3.1.6), the developers remediated the vulnerability by introducing an explicit length boundary check prior to reading the capability flags:
diff --git a/ngap/handler.go b/ngap/handler.go
index 332086b6..8a1011f6 100644
--- a/ngap/handler.go
+++ b/ngap/handler.go
@@ -3265,13 +3265,22 @@ func HandlePathSwitchRequest(ctx ctxt.Context, ran *context.AmfRan, message *nga
}
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
- // not support any E-UTRA algorithms
+ // UESecurityCapabilities has CRITICALITY ignore in PathSwitchRequest
+ // (TS 38.413, PathSwitchRequestIEs). BIT STRING (SIZE(16,...)) must be
+ // at least 2 bytes; when the APER extension bit is set the decoder may
+ // return fewer bytes. Guard against that to avoid an index panic.
+ if len(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes) < 2 ||
+ len(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes) < 2 {
+ ran.Log.Warnln("UESecurityCapabilities bit string too short in PathSwitchRequest; ignoring IE per TS 38.413 PathSwitchRequestIEs criticality IGNORE")
+ } else {
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
+ // not support any E-UTRA algorithms
+ }
}
if rANUENGAPID != nil {The patch aligns directly with 3GPP TS 38.413 specification requirements. In the PathSwitchRequestIEs table of TS 38.413, the UESecurityCapabilities IE is assigned Criticality: IGNORE. By verifying that both NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes and NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes have a length of at least 2 bytes (matching the baseline 16-bit minimum requirement), the patch ensures that index 0 is always safe to read. When a shorter slice is encountered, the AMF logs a warning and ignores the malformed IE while allowing the rest of the PathSwitchRequest procedure to proceed.
> [!NOTE]
> While the patch in commit d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c completely resolves the out-of-bounds read in HandlePathSwitchRequest, it is a localized fix rather than an architectural change to the APER decoder or goroutine lifecycle. Any other NGAP handlers that access extensible BIT STRING or OCTET STRING slice indices without explicit length validation—or without a top-level recover() wrapper in the worker goroutine—could remain susceptible to similar variant panics.
Exploiting CVE-2026-102945 requires specific network positioning and protocol state prerequisites, which accounts for the High Privileges Required (PR:H) metric in its CVSS v3.1 vector. A standard over-the-air (OTA) cellular subscriber or unauthenticated mobile device cannot trigger this vulnerability directly, because PathSwitchRequest is an N2 control-plane message generated exclusively by a gNodeB rather than a NAS message tunnelled transparently from a UE.
To execute the attack, an adversary must satisfy three conditions:
NGSetupRequest / NGSetupResponse exchange with the target AMF.HandlePathSwitchRequest looks up the subscriber context via amfUe := amfSelf.AmfUeFindByAmfUeNgapID(aMFUENGAPID.Value) before reaching the vulnerable uESecurityCapabilities block, the attacker must know a valid AMF-UE-NGAP-ID for a currently registered UE on that AMF.Once a rogue or compromised gNB holds a valid AMF-UE-NGAP-ID (for example, by observing a legitimate UE attach to the compromised cell or by registering a test UE controlled by the attacker through that gNB), the attacker constructs an NGAP PathSwitchRequest PDU (InitiatingMessage, ProcedureCode id-PathSwitchRequest). The PDU must include the required IEs (RAN-UE-NGAP-ID, SourceAMF-UE-NGAP-ID, UserLocationInformation, and PDUSessionToBeSwitchedDLList) alongside a crafted UESecurityCapabilities IE (IE ID 119).
Within the APER-encoded UESecurityCapabilities payload, the attacker sets the leading extension bit of NRencryptionAlgorithms (or NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms) to 1 and encodes the length determinant as 0. When transmitted over the established SCTP stream, the AMF's NGAP receiver reads the SCTP frame, decodes the APER payload without error, and dispatches the message to HandlePathSwitchRequest. Upon evaluating uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0], the AMF immediately panics and exits.
The primary impact of CVE-2026-102945 is a complete denial of service against the 5G Core Access and Mobility Management Function. Because the Go runtime terminates the entire OS process when any single goroutine experiences an unrecovered panic, a single malformed packet from one compromised gNodeB drops all active SCTP associations and N1/N2 signaling sessions across the entire AMF daemon.
In a production 5G Standalone deployment, an abrupt AMF crash severes control-plane connectivity for all legitimate gNodeBs connected to that AMF instance. Subscribers cannot perform initial registration, service requests, handovers, or PDU session modifications until the container orchestrator (such as Kubernetes in an Aether/SD-Core environment) restarts the AMF pod and all connected gNodeBs re-establish their NGAP associations. Furthermore, if the attacker continuously sends the malformed PathSwitchRequest each time the AMF recovers and a UE registers, the control plane enters a persistent crash loop.
The vulnerability is assigned a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.9 (Medium) with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H:
AMF-UE-NGAP-ID.As of publication, CVE-2026-102945 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and no public proof-of-concept exploit repositories or active in-the-wild exploitation campaigns have been recorded.
Operators deploying Aether Project's 5G Core (omec-project/amf) should upgrade immediately to version v3.1.6 or later. Version 3.1.6 incorporates commit d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c, which enforces a minimum 2-byte length check on both NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes and NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes before any slice indexing occurs.
For environments where an immediate binary or container image upgrade cannot be scheduled, network architecture controls should be audited to restrict exposure of the N2 interface:
From a software engineering perspective, Go applications implementing telecommunications signaling protocols (such as NGAP, NAS, or PFCP) should adopt two structural defenses to prevent similar denial-of-service defects:
BIT STRING (SIZE(N, ...)) and OCTET STRING (SIZE(N, ...))) to ensure that callers explicitly verify len(slice) >= expectedBytes before indexing, or update the APER unmarshaling layer to enforce lower bounds even when the extension bit is present.defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { ... } }() recovery block. Isolating unexpected runtime panics to the individual offending message or SCTP association prevents a malformed packet from tearing down the entire AMF control-plane process.CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H| Product | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|
omec-project/amf Aether Project / omec-project | < 3.1.6 | 3.1.6 |
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| CWE Classification | CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) / CWE-248 (Uncaught Exception) |
| CVSS v3.1 Score | 4.9 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) |
| Attack Vector | 3GPP N2 Interface (NGAP over SCTP from rogue/compromised gNodeB) |
| Affected Function | HandlePathSwitchRequest in ngap/handler.go |
| Security Impact | Denial of Service (Unrecovered Go runtime panic terminating AMF process) |
| Patched Version | omec-project/amf v3.1.6 |
| Exploit & KEV Status | No public PoC; Not listed in CISA KEV |
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