Ghost in the Script: Crashing ImageMagick with XML Voodoo (CVE-2026-23952)

ImageMagick is the Swiss Army knife of image processing—it's everywhere, from your favorite social media platform's thumbnail generator to the backend of enterprise content management systems. But buried deep within its vast arsenal of 'coders' (modules that handle specific file formats) lies a relic called MSL (Magick Scripting Language).

MSL is an XML-based scripting language that allows you to define image processing pipelines in a structured text file. Instead of running a complex command-line string, you pass an XML file to the MSL interpreter, and it executes the steps. Ideally, this is a powerful automation tool. Practically, it's a forgotten attack surface that most developers don't realize is enabled by default.

CVE-2026-23952 isn't a complex heap feng-shui masterpiece; it's a classic logic error in how this parser handles the order of operations. It's the digital equivalent of trying to hang a picture frame on a wall you haven't built yet. The result? The application tries to interact with a void, and the operating system kills it with prejudice.

The vulnerability resides in coders/msl.c, specifically in the function MSLEndElement. This function is responsible for handling the closing tags of XML elements. When the parser encounters a </comment> tag, it naturally assumes there is an image object currently in memory that this comment belongs to.

Under normal circumstances, an MSL script loads an image first (via <read> or 

When ImageMagick processes this:

1. It parses <image>. The stack depth increases, but msl_info->image[0] remains NULL because no specific image data (read or new) has been invoked.
2. It parses <comment>Goodbye...</comment>.
3. Upon hitting </comment>, it executes DeleteImageProperty(NULL, "comment").
4. Segmentation Fault.

While a Denial of Service (DoS) might sound less sexy than Remote Code Execution (RCE), in modern cloud architectures, it can be devastating. Image processing is typically handled by asynchronous workers pulling jobs from a queue (e.g., Sidekiq, Celery, SQS).

Imagine an attacker uploads this malicious MSL file as a profile picture or an attachment. The worker picks up the job, attempts to process it, and crashes (segfault). The supervisor process (like Kubernetes or systemd) sees the crash and restarts the worker. The worker comes back online, checks the queue, picks up the same job, and crashes again.

This creates a "poison pill" scenario. A single 100-byte file can permanently jam an image processing pipeline, consuming compute resources in a restart loop and effectively taking down the service until the bad job is manually purged. If the system scales automatically based on CPU load (which spikes during crash/restart), you might even trigger an expensive auto-scaling event for nothing.

The immediate technical fix is to upgrade to Magick.NET 14.10.2 or the corresponding ImageMagick 7.x core release. This patches the coders/msl.c logic.

However, the strategic fix for security teams is to disable coders you don't use. ImageMagick supports hundreds of formats, many of which (like MSL, MVG, and XPS) are powerful scripting languages masquerading as image formats. These are historically prone to vulnerabilities.

Modify your policy.xml file to explicitly disable MSL if you aren't using it. This kills the entire attack class, not just this specific bug.

<!-- /etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml -->
<policymap>
  <!-- ... other policies ... -->
  
  <!-- DISABLE MSL SCRIPTING -->
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL" />
</policymap>

This is the digital equivalent of welding the window shut because you never open it anyway.