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Made with love by Amit Schendel & Alon Barad



CVE-2026-73864

CVE-2026-73864: Unverified Native Artifact Download Leading to Remote Code Execution in install-artifact-from-github

Amit Schendel
Amit Schendel
Senior Security Researcher

Nov 19, 2026·11 min read·0 visits

Executive Summary (TL;DR)

Versions of install-artifact-from-github prior to 1.7.0 download and load prebuilt native Node.js (.node) binaries without cryptographic integrity verification, enabling arbitrary native code execution via asset tampering, mirror poisoning, or network interception.

CVE-2026-73864 is a CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check) vulnerability in the Node.js package install-artifact-from-github prior to version 1.7.0. The tool downloads precompiled native Node.js C/C++ addons (.node binaries) from GitHub Releases or configurable mirrors and writes them directly to disk without verifying cryptographic checksums or signatures. Furthermore, its HTTP client follows cross-protocol redirects from HTTPS to plaintext HTTP. When the consuming application loads the downloaded addon via require(), the unverified native binary executes immediately within the Node.js process, permitting arbitrary native code execution if an attacker compromises a GitHub release asset, poisons a configured mirror, or intercepts downgraded network traffic.

Vulnerability Overview

install-artifact-from-github is a zero-dependency Node.js utility designed to streamline the installation of packages containing native C/C++ addons, most notably node-re2. Compiling native extensions from source during npm install via node-gyp requires a local C++ toolchain and significant build time. To bypass local compilation, install-artifact-from-github determines the host operating system, CPU architecture, and Node.js Application Binary Interface (ABI) version, then fetches a precompiled .node shared library hosted as a GitHub Release asset.

In versions prior to 1.7.0, the installation script (bin/install-from-cache.js) retrieves compressed or uncompressed binary payloads over the network and writes them directly to the target filesystem path without verifying their cryptographic integrity. The tool neither validates a cryptographic hash (such as SHA-256) nor checks a digital signature before persisting the binary to disk or loading it into the runtime.

This design flaw is classified under CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check). In the Node.js ecosystem, a .node file is a native dynamic library (an ELF shared object on Linux, a Mach-O dylib on macOS, or a PE DLL on Windows). When a consuming package calls require() on the downloaded file, the operating system dynamic linker maps the binary into the Node.js process memory and immediately executes its initialization routines (such as napi_register_module_v1 or NODE_MODULE constructors).

Because there is no cryptographic trust boundary separating the remote download source from the local dynamic linker, any modification to the binary payload in storage or in transit results in arbitrary native code execution within the security context of the Node.js runtime.

Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of CVE-2026-73864 lies in a decoupled trust model between the npm package registry and GitHub Release assets, combined with permissive network transport handling in bin/install-from-cache.js. When a developer publishes a version of a package to the npm registry, the tarball and its package.json are immutable and covered by npm's subresource integrity hashes in the consumer's package-lock.json. However, the prebuilt .node binaries fetched at install time reside outside the npm tarball as mutable assets attached to a GitHub Release tag.

When bin/install-from-cache.js executes during the package installation lifecycle, it constructs a target URL pointing either to github.com/<owner>/<repo>/releases/download/<version>/<platform>-<arch>-<abi> or to a custom mirror specified via environment variables (such as RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR or DOWNLOAD_MIRROR) or package.json configuration (download.host). The script attempts to download the artifact with .br (Brotli), .gz (Gzip), or uncompressed extensions.

During the network retrieval phase, the internal HTTP client handles 301, 302, 307, and 308 redirects recursively. Prior to version 1.7.0, this redirect logic permitted cross-protocol downgrades from TLS-encrypted https:// endpoints to unencrypted http:// endpoints. Once the byte stream finishes downloading, the script decompresses the buffer in memory using node:zlib (brotliDecompress or gunzip) and passes the resulting raw Buffer directly to fs.promises.writeFile(artifactPath, data).

Although the installation pipeline includes an optional verify-build step, that check works by spawning a child process or invoking require() on the written binary to execute basic functional unit tests. Because native shared library initialization constructors and N-API registration callbacks execute automatically upon dlopen() / LoadLibrary() when require() is called, any malicious payload embedded in the .node file runs before the functional verification test can evaluate the module exports.

Code Analysis

In versions prior to 1.7.0, bin/install-from-cache.js fetched the compressed artifact, decompressed it, and immediately wrote it to artifactPath. The following excerpt illustrates the vulnerable decompression and file writing pipeline prior to commit 1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633:

// Vulnerable flow prior to 1.7.0 in bin/install-from-cache.js
try {
  // Downloads from GitHub Release or Mirror and decompresses straight to disk
  const data = await promisify(zlib.brotliDecompress)(await get(prefix + '.br'));
  console.log(`Writing to ${artifactPath} ...`);
  await write(artifactPath, data);
  copied = true;
} catch (e) {
  // Fallback to .gz and uncompressed without any digest check
}

Commit 1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633 resolves the issue by anchoring artifact integrity to the immutable package.json distributed via the npm registry. The patch introduces a new CLI utility, bin/hash-github-cache.js, which maintainers run prior to publishing (prepublishOnly). This utility fetches all platform-specific release binaries from GitHub, decompresses them, computes their SHA-256 digests (sha256:<hex>), and records an artifactHashes dictionary inside the consuming package's package.json.

At installation time, bin/install-from-cache.js loads the artifactHashes map from package.json and gates every filesystem write behind the verifyArtifact function:

import {createHash} from 'node:crypto';
 
// Construct the platform/ABI identifier key (e.g., "linux-x64-137")
const slot = `${platform}-${platformArch}-${abiSlot}`;
 
// Verification applies only when fetching from the canonical GitHub release source
const isDefaultSource = !mirrorHost && !process.env[mirrorEnvVar];
let artifactHashes = null;
 
if (isDefaultSource && pkg.artifactHashes && typeof pkg.artifactHashes == 'object') {
  artifactHashes = pkg.artifactHashes;
}
 
// Integrity verification gate
const verifyArtifact = data => {
  if (!isDefaultSource || !artifactHashes) return true;
  const expected = artifactHashes[slot],
    actual = 'sha256:' + createHash('sha256').update(data).digest('hex');
  if (expected && expected === actual) return true;
  console.log(`Integrity check failed for ${slot}: building from sources ...`);
  return false;
};

The decompression handlers for Brotli, Gzip, and raw binaries were updated to verify the decompressed byte buffer in memory before invoking write(). If verifyArtifact(artifact) returns false—either because the computed SHA-256 hash does not match expected or because the target slot is missing from artifactHashes—the script sets rejected = true, aborts further download attempts, refrains from writing the binary to disk, and forces a fallback to local source compilation (npm run rebuild):

// Patched extraction pipeline in bin/install-from-cache.js
try {
  const artifact = await promisify(zlib.brotliDecompress)(await get(prefix + '.br'));
  if (verifyArtifact(artifact)) {
    console.log(`Writing to ${artifactPath} ...`);
    await write(artifactPath, artifact);
    copied = true;
  } else {
    rejected = true; // Fail closed: discard buffer and trigger source compilation
  }
} catch (e) {
  // Error handling
}

> [!NOTE] > Assessment of Fix Completeness: The patch introduces two intentional design constraints that security engineers must account for. First, if a consuming package does not include an artifactHashes object in its package.json, !artifactHashes evaluates to true and verification is skipped for backward compatibility. Second, if a deployment configures a custom mirror (!isDefaultSource), verification is bypassed under the assumption that the mirror operator acts as an independent trust root and may serve custom-built binaries. Additionally, version 1.7.0 introduces the --force-build CLI flag and DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD (or <PREFIX>_FORCE_BUILD) environment variable to allow security-sensitive environments to bypass binary downloads entirely.

Exploitation

Exploiting CVE-2026-73864 requires an attacker to position a malicious native shared library (.node file) along the download path queried by bin/install-from-cache.js, followed by a user or automated CI/CD pipeline executing npm install and loading the package. There are three primary vectors to achieve this condition.

Vector 1: GitHub Release Asset Replacement (Supply Chain Compromise) An attacker who compromises a GitHub personal access token (PAT), CI/CD release workflow, or maintainer account with write permissions to the upstream repository can replace an existing binary asset attached to an already-published GitHub Release (for example, replacing linux-x64-127.br). Because the npm registry tarball and package-lock.json integrity hashes only cover the JavaScript wrapper and metadata published to npm—not external GitHub Release assets—existing consumers pinned to a specific package version will download the replaced binary on subsequent clean installs or CI builds without triggering any npm lockfile integrity warnings.

Vector 2: Mirror Environment Variable Poisoning install-artifact-from-github checks environment variables derived from the package prefix (such as RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR for node-re2 or the generic DOWNLOAD_MIRROR) to override the base download URL. If an attacker can inject environment variables into a build environment (for instance, through untrusted environment variable injection in CI/CD pipelines, compromised .npmrc configurations, or shared build runners), they can redirect install-from-cache.js to an attacker-controlled HTTP server hosting malicious .node artifacts.

Vector 3: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) via Protocol Downgrade Because the custom HTTP client in bin/install-from-cache.js follows Location headers across protocol boundaries (https:// to http://), an on-path network adversary or a malicious proxy/mirror capable of triggering a redirect to a plaintext http:// endpoint can modify the binary stream in transit.

Once the attacker delivers the crafted payload, exploitation occurs deterministically when the module is loaded. A weaponized .node binary compiled for the target platform (e.g., an x86_64 Linux ELF shared library) only needs to define a constructor function using __attribute__((constructor)) in C/C++ or register an N-API initialization hook:

#include <stdlib.h>
 
// Executes immediately when Node.js calls dlopen() via require('./build/Release/addon.node')
__attribute__((constructor))
static void on_load(void) {
    // Arbitrary native code execution in the context of the Node.js process
    system("id > /tmp/pwned");
}

When install-from-cache.js runs its post-download verify-build step (or when the application later imports the library), Node.js invokes process.dlopen(), which triggers on_load() immediately inside the host process.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-73864 grants the attacker arbitrary native code execution within the privileges of the user or service account running the Node.js process. Because native addons execute directly on the underlying OS outside any V8 JavaScript sandbox restrictions, the payload has unrestricted access to the host filesystem, environment variables, process memory, network sockets, and any credentials accessible to the runtime.

In automated CI/CD build environments, install-from-cache.js runs automatically as a postinstall or install lifecycle script during npm install or npm ci (unless --ignore-scripts is passed). Since install-from-cache.js executes npm test or npm run verify-build immediately after writing the binary to verify that the prebuilt addon loads properly on the host ABI, code execution is triggered during the package installation phase itself, before the consuming application is even deployed or started. In CI/CD pipelines, this exposes deployment secrets, cloud provider IAM tokens, npm publishing tokens, and source code repositories.

The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). The Attack Complexity is rated High (AC:H) because the attacker must either compromise an upstream release repository/mirror or establish an active network interception position, while User Interaction is Required (UI:R) because a user or build pipeline must initiate the package installation. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability impacts are all rated High (C:H/I:H/A:H) due to full native code execution.

At the time of publication, CVE-2026-73864 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and no public weaponized exploits have been observed in the wild.

Remediation

Remediation requires coordinated action from both downstream package maintainers who depend on install-artifact-from-github to distribute native addons and end-user organizations consuming those packages.

For Package Maintainers

  1. Upgrade to Version 1.7.0 or Later: Update the dependency in package.json to install-artifact-from-github@^1.7.0.
  2. Generate and Publish artifactHashes: Upgrading the dependency alone is insufficient if package.json lacks the cryptographic hash dictionary. Maintainers must invoke hash-github-cache --write after uploading prebuilt assets to GitHub Releases and before running npm publish. Add the following lifecycle script to package.json to automate hash generation:
{
  "scripts": {
    "prepublishOnly": "hash-github-cache --write"
  }
}

When executed, hash-github-cache --write downloads all platform assets for the current package version from GitHub, calculates the SHA-256 digest of each decompressed .node binary, and writes the artifactHashes field directly into package.json so it is cryptographically sealed inside the npm registry tarball.

For Application Developers and Enterprise Consumers

  1. Update Transitive Dependencies: Ensure that downstream packages utilizing install-artifact-from-github (such as node-re2) are updated to versions that bundle install-artifact-from-github >= 1.7.0 and contain a populated artifactHashes object in their package.json.
  2. Force Local Compilation from Source: In high-security environments or regulated CI/CD pipelines where downloading precompiled binaries from GitHub Releases is prohibited by policy, bypass the binary download mechanism entirely and force local C++ compilation via node-gyp by setting the appropriate environment variable in the build environment:
# Generic override for all packages using install-artifact-from-github >= 1.7.0
export DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD=1
 
# Package-specific override for node-re2
export RE2_FORCE_BUILD=1
  1. Audit Custom Mirror Configurations: Remember that setting a custom mirror via DOWNLOAD_MIRROR or <PREFIX>_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR disables the artifactHashes verification check in version 1.7.0. If an internal artifact mirror (such as Artifactory or Nexus) is used, ensure that access to the mirror occurs strictly over HTTPS, that environment variables in CI/CD runners cannot be overridden by untrusted pull requests, and that binaries uploaded to the internal mirror are independently verified against upstream digests.

Official Patches

GitHub (uhop/install-artifact-from-github)Commit 1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633 introducing SHA-256 artifact hash bag verification
GitHub (uhop/install-artifact-from-github)Release 1.7.0 containing the fix for CVE-2026-73864
GitHub Security AdvisoryOfficial GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396

Fix Analysis (1)

Technical Appendix

CVSS Score
7.5/ 10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Systems

install-artifact-from-github (npm package) versions < 1.7.0Downstream Node.js applications and packages consuming prebuilt native addons via install-artifact-from-github < 1.7.0 (including vulnerable configurations of node-re2)

Affected Versions Detail

Product
Affected Versions
Fixed Version
install-artifact-from-github
uhop
< 1.7.0 (1.0.0 - 1.6.0)1.7.0
AttributeDetail
CVE IDCVE-2026-73864 (GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396)
Weakness ClassCWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
CVSS v3.1 Score7.5 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Affected Componentinstall-artifact-from-github (< 1.7.0) - bin/install-from-cache.js
Attack VectorNetwork (GitHub Release Asset Tampering, Mirror Poisoning, or HTTPS-to-HTTP MitM)
Security ImpactArbitrary Native Code Execution (RCE) via unverified .node shared library loading
Patched Version1.7.0 (Commit 1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633)
CISA KEV StatusNot Listed

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
Initial Access
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Initial Access
T1565.002Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation
Impact
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
Credential Access
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution
CWE-494
Download of Code Without Integrity Check

The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.

Vulnerability Timeline

Initial vulnerability research, threat modeling, and artifact integrity design document created.
2026-07-06
Field survey of native addon distribution models completed and client-owned hash-bag architecture finalized.
2026-07-07
Fix committed to uhop/install-artifact-from-github repository (commit 1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633).
2026-07-08
Version 1.7.0 released, GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 published, and CVE-2026-73864 assigned.
2026-11-18

References & Sources

  • [1]GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396
  • [2]GitHub Fix Commit (1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633)
  • [3]install-artifact-from-github Release 1.7.0
  • [4]National Vulnerability Database (NVD) - CVE-2026-73864
  • [5]CVE.org Record - CVE-2026-73864
  • [6]CVEProject cvelistV5 JSON Record - CVE-2026-73864

Attack Flow Diagram

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